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Software plays an increasing role in managing the
responsibilities of many areas in society. As we’ve
continued to cede more responsibility to software, the
potential damage done from insecure software has grown.
It is not hard to find examples of security breaches that
have resulted in major financial losses and personal
hardships for consumers.
• Step 1: Select a vulnerability in an open-source product.
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 Measure the effectiveness of modern static analysis
tools at identifying, with programmer-defined
annotations, security vulnerabilities.
 Identify a set of best practices for developers to follow
when using formal specifications while programming or
retrofitting existing programs.
• Step 2: Identify the incorrect code and the corresponding fix.
• Step 3: Create annotations which might identify the error.
• Step 4: Test which annotations, if any, actually identify the error.
We are continuing to add to our dataset of software
vulnerability corrections and annotations for these
corrections.
As the data set grows, we will be better able to identify
the best practices for using formal methods to improve
computer security.
While formal methods have gained popularity in safety-
critical systems, they are much less common in other
categories of software. Formal methods can help create
better software, however, which would also be more
secure. “Half of cyber vulnerabilities are software defects
and the cost of avoiding and mitigating software errors
approaches $100B annually.” [1] Our project hopes to
help bring formal methods to more types of software.
Lessons Learned
Retrofitting is still hard.
While the tools for static analysis with formal methods
have improved in the past few years, it is still not easy to
take a project which has not used formal methods and
retrofit the code to work with current tools. This is often
given as one of the main reasons why formal methods
have not gained widespread acceptance for cybersecurity
[2].
More annotations would be helpful.
Today’s static analysis tools can only check a subset of
possible operations. Some of the annotations that have
yet to be implemented, such as whether or not a
particular variable is assigned a value inside a method,
have only limited support. If these annotations were
checkable, it might improve the success rate for detecting
vulnerabilities.
